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Various states and other local jurisdictions have enacted laws intending to reduce 
predatory and abusive lending in the subprime mortgage market.  These laws have 
created substantial geographic variation in the regulation of mortgage credit.  This paper 
examines whether these laws are associated with a higher or lower cost of credit.  
Empirical results indicate that the laws are associated with at most a modest increase in 
cost.  However, the impact depends on the product type.  In particular, loans with fixed 
(adjustable) rates are associated a modest increase (decrease) in cost. 
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  Predatory Lending Laws and the Cost of Credit  
Introduction 
Predatory lending laws are today’s usury laws.  The laws focus on the high cost or 
subprime segment of the mortgage market and typically restrict certain types of loans 
such as loans with prepayment penalties and balloon payments.  Those borrowers who 
are still able to still get a loan when a law is in place may be required to pay for at least 
part of the regulatory costs associated with complying or violating the laws (assuming 
compliance is nontrivial). 
 
This paper tests to see whether the existence of a predatory lending law is associated with 
higher Annual Percentage Rates (APRs) -- which represent the full cost of borrowing, 
including upfront points and fees -- or with higher periodic interest rates.  In addition, a 
law index is used to measure the relative strength of each law and test whether stronger 
laws, in terms of restrictions and coverage, differentially impact the cost of credit. 
 
The introduction of predatory lending laws at the state, county, and city levels has 
provided substantial geographic variation in the regulation of high-cost mortgage credit.  
We largely focus on the impact of state laws because they have been the most durable in 
the face of legal challenges mounted by lending associations and other forms of 
government.  Because state boundaries reflect political and not economic regions, we 
compare mortgage market conditions in states with a law in effect
1 with those in 
neighboring states currently without a predatory lending law.  However, instead of 
examining whole states or regions, we focus on multi-state metropolitan and micropolitan 
  2areas that cross state boundaries with variations in the laws.  This geographic-based 
sampling is used to help identify the impact of the predatory lending law on the cost of 
subprime credit by examining mortgages in similar labor and housing markets. 
Subprime and Predatory Lending 
The subprime mortgage market provides the opportunity of homeownership and access to 
credit to those who are not eligible to take part in the prime or conventional market.  
Therefore, the subprime market completes the mortgage market and can enhance welfare 
(Chinloy and MacDonald, 2005).  Predatory lending depends on the inability of the 
borrower to understand the loan terms and the obligations associated with them.  For 
example, interviews held by HUD, the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve Board indicate 
that some, perhaps many, borrowers using high-cost loans may not have understood the 
terms of the loans, leading to extremely high interest rates and upfront fees (HUD-
Treasury, 2000 and Federal Reserve, 2002).   
 
In 2002, partly in response to these hearings, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
strengthened the existing Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) as 
articulated in Regulation Z.  HOEPA defines a class of loans that are given special 
consideration because they are more likely to have predatory features and require 
additional disclosures. HOEPA-covered loans (loans where HOEPA applies) include only 
closed-end home equity loans that meet APR and upfront finance fee triggers.  Home 
purchase loans and other types of lending backed by a home, such as lines of credit, are 
not covered by HOEPA.  
 
  3However, rising foreclosure rates, the continuing market penetration of subprime lenders, 
and the geographic concentration of subprime lending in low-income and minority 
neighborhoods have lead to concerns in many communities that HOEPA did not do 
enough to restrict loans likely to contain predatory features.  By the end of 2004 at least 
23 states had passed predatory lending laws that are currently in effect; including 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin.   
 
These laws follow the structure of HOEPA by defining a class of loans likely to be 
associated with predation and then restrict certain practices for covered loans.  Ho and 
Pennington-cross (2005) detail in Appendix A each of the predatory lending laws.  An 
index is created to measure the strength of each law.  The index can be broken down into 
a coverage component and a restrictions component.   The coverage category includes 
measures of loan purpose, APR first lien, APR higher liens, and points and fees.  In 
general, if the law does not increase the coverage beyond HOEPA it is assigned zero 
points.  Higher points are assigned if the coverage is more general.  The restrictions index 
includes measures of prepayment penalty restrictions, balloon restrictions, counseling 
requirements, and restrictions on mandatory arbitration.  If the law does not require any 
restrictions on covered loans, then zero points are assigned.  Higher points indicate more 
restrictions.  The index is scaled so that each of the eight subcomponents is on average 
equal to one.
2  Therefore, as shown in Table 1, by design the average index has the value 
of 8.  However, there is wide variation from a low of just less than 1.5 for the laws in 
  4Maine and Nevada to over 17 for the law in Illinois.  There is also substantial variation in 
the extent of restriction and coverage.  In addition, the restrictions and coverage 
components are not strongly correlated. 
Literature Review 
There is a growing literature relating local and state predatory lending laws to conditions 
in the subprime mortgage market.  Primarily the literature has focused on case studies on 
a law-by-law basis.  Overall there is strong evidence that the introduction of the first state 
level predatory lending law in North Carolina did reduce the number of applications and 
originations of subprime loans (Ernst, Farris, and Stein, 2002; Quercia, Stegman, and 
Davis, 2003; Harvey and Nigro, 2004; and Elliehausen and Staten, 2004) and the laws 
passed in Chicago and Philadelphia, which are no longer in effect, also had a similar 
impact (Harvey and Nigro, 2003).  However, the impacts found in these studies have 
turned out not to be the typical market response to the introduction of predatory lending 
laws.  In particular, the laws can have no impact, decrease, and even increase the number 
of applications and originations for subprime loans (Ho and Pennington-Cross, 2006).  
One explanation for the increased application rate after a law is passed is that potential 
applicants may feel more comfortable applying for a subprime loan if a lending law 
covers their application.
3 As a result, the subprime market can actually grow after a law 
has been enacted.  In contrast, laws that reduce applications and originations have 
stronger restrictions.  Stronger laws are also associated with lower rejection rates on 
subprime applications.   
 
  5In contrast to the growing literature on the flow (applications and originations) of 
subprime credit much less is known about the impact of the laws on the pricing or cost of 
credit.  Pricing in the subprime market is not as transparent or homogeneous as in the 
prime market (Chomsisengphet and Pennington-cross, 2006; and White, 2004) making 
identifying the impact of predatory lending laws on the cost of credit more difficult.  In 
addition, the growing dominance of adjustable rate loans in the subprime market (using 
LoanPerformance data adjustable rate mortgages have grown from 40 percent of the 
market in 2000 to over 65 percent in 2005) requires careful consideration of the detailed 
characteristics of a loan (for example, margin, teaser, cap and floor, and index).  In 
addition, there is some evidence that subprime borrowers tend to pay much higher fees 
during origination and underwriting (Stein, 2001) making it important to measure the full 
cost of borrowing in addition to the initial or periodic interest rate on the loan.   
 
Li and Ernst (2005) examine the impact of various state predatory lending laws on the 
spread between prevailing risk free rates and the periodic or initial interest rate on 
subprime loans.  The data set represents securitized subprime loans, which may include 
A- and Alt-A loans, leased from LoanPerformance as represented in their Asset Backed 
Securities data sets.  This data set provides extensive detail on product types, but does not 
provide full coverage of the subprime market. All of the U.S. is included in the sample 
and 34 dummy variables are used to characterize the different nuances of the lending 
laws.  The results do not provide any consistent evidence that state predatory lending 
laws have a recognizable impact on periodic interest rates.  Some coefficients have 
negative signs; others have positive signs and over one half of coefficient estimates are 
  6insignificant.  Given the number of loans used to conduct the analysis (ranging from over 
100,000 to over 450,000), the results should be very precise.  Therefore, to date there is 
no consistent evidence (that the authors are aware of) that local and state predatory 
lending laws are associated with a consistent change in the cost of credit in the mortgage 
market.    
Motivation – Cost of Credit 
If lenders incur higher cost due to the introduction of predatory lending laws, then these 
costs might be passed on to consumers in the form of higher fees and higher interest rates 
on the loans.  Lenders must report to local authorities the nature and extent of high-cost 
(covered) loans they originate and make sure that they are not violating any of the 
predatory laws.  This may be fairly simple to do for a local lender, but for a national 
lender it is necessary to monitor all state and local lending laws that are pending and in 
effect, as well as any legal challenges and changes to these laws.   
 
If the laws create a regulatory burden on lenders and this burden or cost is passed on to 
consumers, then borrower cost should be higher in locations with the law in effect.  In 
addition, the laws could differentially impact periodic interest rates, initial points and 
fees, and product types.   
 
Since adjustable rates are the dominate form of lending in the subprime market it is 
important to consider differences between the pricing of fixed rate and adjustable rate 
mortgages.  Consider a two-period model following the work of Bruekner (1986) and Sa-
Aadu and Sirmans (1989).
4  The two-period model allows a simple illustration of the role 
  7of uncertainty in the pricing of mortgages and the impact of changing interest rates.  The 
rate on a mortgage in the first time period, t=0 (the initial rate), is defined as 
s i r + = 0 0 ; (1) 
r0, the interest rate in the first time period, is defined as the sum of the initial rate on an 
index (i0) plus the spread (s) over the index.  The spread is constant over the life of the 
loan but the index can change in the second period (i1) for adjustable rate loans.  In 
typical parlance, the spread is often called the margin on an adjustable rate loan.  The 
index represents the cost of funds to the lender in the two time periods, t=0 and t=1.  The 
spread compensates the lender for the risk associated with the loan.  These risks include 
interest rate and credit risks. 
 
Loans can also include a discount (δ) in the first time period below the fully indexed rate 
in the first period (r0).  Borrowers may also pay additional fees upfront (f) to reduce the 
interest rate, which are often referred to as points paid. Therefore, the initial rate can be 
represented as 
f s i r + − + = δ 0 0  (2) 
The initial rate is defined as the sum of the index, the spread, and upfront fees less the 
discount.  This representation provides the cost of credit in the first time period; however, 
upfront fees are not included when calculating the fully amortizing payment. Therefore, a 
mortgage can be structured with the same expected return that includes various levels of 
initial rates depending on the spread, discount, and upfront fees.  In general, holding 
returns constant higher fees and a higher spread or a lower discount should be associated 
with lower initial rates. 
  8 
In the second time period, t=1, the rate on the mortgage is uncertain for an adjustable rate 
mortgage and depends on the index value (i1), the margin or spread (s), the fully adjusted 
rate (i1+s), and any limits placed on i1+s as defined by the cap (c).  Therefore, the rate of 
return in the second period can take on two forms depending on whether the cap is 
binding or not.   
, 0 1 c r s i + > + then     , 0 1 c r r + =
, 0 1 c r s i + < + then   .  (3)  s i r + = 1 1
In the second period the rate on the mortgage (r1), or return to the lender, is the initial rate 
(r0) plus the cap (c) if the cap is binding and the fully indexed rate (i1+s) if the cap is not 
binding.  Therefore, the cap can be designed to shift all the interest rate risk to the 
borrower or the lender.  In the limit the cap can be designed so that it is never binding 
(c=∞) and all the interest rate risk is transferred to the borrower or so that it is always 
binding (c=0). When c=0 it is equivalent to a fixed rate mortgage.  Therefore, a fixed rate 
mortgage can be viewed as a subset or special case for adjustable rate mortgages where 
the cap is always binding.  
 
The index for the second period can be viewed as a random variable and the expected 
return for the second period is as follows: 
() () ( )() , 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
0







+ + + =    (4) 
where f(i1) is the probability density function for interest rates in the second time period.  
The cap impacts the expected return and the extent that the cap matters depends on the 
  9distribution of interest rates in the second time period f(i1)di.  Since the spread is used to 
compensate for other costs, the more volatile interest rates, or the index, the larger the 
margin will need to be to compensate for the lender taking on interest rate risk.  The 
expected return can also be modified to include a measure of credit risk, which is 
assumed to occur only when the value of the mortgage is higher than the value of the 







 to the expected return. B is the outstanding balance 
on the loan; V is the value of the mortgage; and g(V) is the probability density function 
for V.  Since default is a cost, the required rate of return in the second period will be 
higher and the spread can be used to increase the return to compensate for the credit risk.  
For a fixed rate loan the expected return in the second time period is the initial interest 









This two-period model primarily shows that the spread on a loan is a complicated mixture 
of many characteristics, including the variance of future rates, credit risks (property 
values), upfront fees, discounts, and caps.  In particular, the spread is used to compensate 
the lender for all costs except for the cost of funds.  Fixed rate loans should require a 
higher margin to compensate for the lender being exposed to all of the interest rate risk 
and adjustable rate loans can be viewed as being in a continuum from full lender 
exposure to interest rate risk to no lender exposure to interest rate risk depending on the 
cap.  In addition, any costs associated with complying with local laws and regulations 
should be associated with a higher spread to maintain the required rate of return. 
  10Annual Percentage Rates (APR) 
This section examines the impact of a predatory lending law on the APR of a high cost 
loan.  In particular, for the calendar year 2004, HMDA provides the spread between the 
APR on high cost mortgages and the yield on Treasury bills of comparable maturity (S).  
The spread is only reported if it is above 3 percent for first-lien loans or 5 percent for 
subordinate liens. 
 
To aid identification, a geographic-based sampling approach is used.  In particular, only 
loans in metropolitan and micropolitan areas (MSAs) that cross state borders where at 
least one state has a law in effect are included.  Table 2 provides a list of the 35 
micropolitan and metropolitan areas included in the estimation.  All loans that meet the 
loan type and location criteria are included.  A variable called Ineffect indicates that the 
loan is located in a location where a predatory lending law is currently in effect.  Only 
locations where the law is in effect before the beginning of 2004 are included.  Therefore, 
if there is a regulatory cost passed on to the consumer, it should be reflected in a positive 
coefficient estimate for Ineffect.   
 
In a reduced form specification, individual loan observations are used to explain how the 
spread (S) is related to mortgage, borrower, and location characteristics as available in 
HMDA:   
j j l j b j m j p c j L B M P S ε α α α α α + + + + + = , (5) 
where j indexes the individual loan originations, S is the spread as defined above, P 
indicates whether a loan is in a location with a predatory lending law in effect, M 
  11represents mortgage characteristics, B represents borrower characteristics, L represents 
locations characteristics, and ε represents an identically and independently distributed 
random error term. 
 
Table 3 provides a description of the variables used in the estimation as well as their 
summary statistics.  The average spread is 4.78 percentage points above the comparable 
term T-bill and 44 percent of the sample is in locations with a law.  Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of APR spread by lien status for the estimation sample and indicates that 
second-lien and higher-lien loans have higher spreads.  The figure also provides an 
indication of what proportion of loans would be covered by the predatory lending laws 
using the APR trigger only.  The APR trigger typically varies from 6 to 10 percent 
depending on the state and the lien category.  For example, under the Maryland law, 
which has a first-lien APR trigger of 7 percent and a second-lien trigger of 9 percent, 
approximately 2 percent of first-lien loans and 3 percent of second-lien loans would be 
covered using HMDA national distributions.   
 
Mortgage characteristics are controlled by including dummy variables for loan size, lien 
position, and loan purpose (home improvement, investor, and refinance).  The reference 
loan is a purchase, owner-occupied, first-lien, medium-sized loan.  It is expected that 
purchase, owner-occupied, first-lien loans have a lower risk profile and should have a 
lower APR.  In addition, due to fixed costs associated with underwriting, larger loans are 
likely to have lower APRs also (Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess, 2005).   Borrower 
characteristics include borrower ethnicity and a proxy for borrower credit scores.  Higher 
  12credit scores should be associated with lower APRs, while nonwhite borrowers, due to 
missing variables such as wealth and health status, will likely be associated with higher 
APRs.  The average Fair Isaac FICO score for the census tract of the property is 
calculated from 2004 originated subprime loans using the Loanperformance Asset 
Backed Securities (ABS) data set.  Metro- and micropolitan area (MSA) dummies are 
included to control for location-specific unobserved characteristics and there are no priors 
regarding their sign or magnitude.  The summary statistics indicate that the high cost 
HMDA loans come from locations with relatively low credit scores (FICO=641) and a 
substantial fraction of nonwhite borrowers.
5   
 
Using ordinary least squares, three different specifications are tested.  Model 1 includes 
an indicator that the loan is in a location with a law, while models 2 and 3 include two 
different versions of the law index.  In addition, for identification purposes the 
specification in model 1 requires that the MSA includes locations without a law and at 
most one location with a law in effect (single-law MSAs).  When the law index is 
introduced, variation in the index allows identification in areas with two or more different 
laws (multi-law MSAs).  MSAs without any laws are excluded from all samples.  
Therefore, models 2 and 3 have a larger number of observed loans (over 95,000 in model 
1 and over 199,000 in models 2 and 3). 
 
In general the results in Table 4 indicate that predatory lending laws have only a modest 
impact on the cost of credit.  Model 1 indicates that loans originated in locations with a 
predatory lending law paid 11.7 basis points less than a comparable loan in locations 
  13without a law.  Model 2 indicates that stronger laws are also associated with lower 
spreads.  For example, a strong law such as Washington, D.C.’s law is associated with a 
15 basis point reduction in the APR spread.  Model 3 indicates that the reduction in the 
spread is associated more strongly with the extent of coverage than the extent of 
restrictions the law imposes.  In general, this set of results provide no support for the 
notion that predatory lending laws impose a regulatory burden that will be passed on to 
the consumer through higher interest rates or upfront fees.   
 
The mortgage, borrower, and location controls largely meet expectations.   For example, 
smaller loans have higher spreads likely indicating the role of fixed underwriting costs.
6  
In addition, spreads are higher for home improvement loans, refinances, and secondary 
liens.  However, there does not seem to be a premium associated with investor loans.  In 
terms of locations and borrower characteristics, nonwhite households are associated with 
higher spreads and Hispanic borrowers are not associated with any detectable difference 
in spreads.  As indicated earlier, if nonwhite borrowers are associated with unobserved 
characteristics that would increase the cost of borrowing, then this may be reflected in the 
nonwhite coefficient estimate.  The proxy for credit score, the subprime FICO tract level 
average, is also associated with lower spreads.  The location-specific dummy variables 
are both positive and negative and are significant a little over one-half of the time.  These 
results indicate that interest rate premiums for subprime loans may reflect perceptions of 
the risks associated with each location and the legal environment (Ambrose and Buttimer, 
2005). 
  14Differences-in-Differences and Interest Rates 
While the HMDA specification allows for the study of the full cost of borrowing, as 
measured by the APR, it does not include important variables used in the pricing and 
underwriting of subprime loans such as credit scores and down payments 
(Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, 2006).  HMDA also does not permit the 
identification of adjustable and fixed rate loan types.  To alleviate these issues, data from 
LoanPerformance on securitized subprime is used in this section.  The data include 
individual loan down payment, FICO score at origination, great detail about the loan 
type, and adjustable rate details such as the margin and caps on periodic interest rate 
adjustments.  However, the APR is not reported and there is no information on the 
upfront fees and points paid.
 7
 
To remove some unobserved heterogeneity, we limit the sample to 30-year fixed and 
adjustable (hybrid) rate single-family property loans.  We also limit our attention to the 
dominate type of adjustable rate mortgage in subprime, the 2/28 adjustable rate mortgage 
(2/28 arm), which is a hybrid loan whose rate is fixed for the first 2 years and adjustable 
for the next 28 years.
8  Adjustments to the periodic interest rate are indexed to the six-
month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).  However, the 2/28 arm still has 
substantial heterogeneity in terms of adjustment caps, teasers, and other factors that will 
need to be controlled for to create an accurate loan level measure of the interest rate cost.   
 
As with HMDA only metropolitan and micropolitan areas with variations in laws are 
included in the sample.  However, the LoanPerformance data are available through time.  
  15Time variation can be used to improve identification of the impact of the law coming into 
effect.  We sample loans before and after the law comes into effect.  In particular, only 
loan originations from 6 to 18 months before and 6 to 18 months after the law becomes 
effective are included in the sample.  This “donut” hole sampling approach makes sure 
that any temporary adjustments to the law are not included in coefficient estimates.   
 
The key variable of interest is Ineffect.  This variable indicates that a loan is in a location 
when and where a predatory lending law is effective, or “in effect”.  It is defined as zero 
before the law is effective regardless of law status.  Ineffect is constructed by interacting 
the variable Law, which indicates locations where the law will eventually be in effect, 
and Postlaw, which indicates the time period after a law has become in effect.  Therefore, 
Law identifies the treatment location and Postlaw identifies the time period the treatment 
is in effect.  There are no priors regarding the coefficients on Law or Postlaw, because 
they will capture prevailing market conditions that are not controlled for by other 
variables.  Dummy variables are included for each MSA and interacted with both Postlaw 
and Law.  Therefore, location and time-specific effects for each MSA are controlled for 
by this set of variables.  The remaining variation associated with the time period when the 
law is in effect in the location with a law (Ineffect) is interpreted as the impact of the law 
on the spread.  This type of dummy structure is commonly referred to as a differences-in-
differences estimation due to the time and location control variables.  In addition, the 
geographic sampling strategy aids identification of the laws’ impact.   
  16Specification 
Two main features used to determine interest rates are credit history and down payments 
(or the Loan-To-Value, LTV, ratio).  It is important to consider whether these variables 
could be endogenous and jointly determined with the interest or spread on the mortgage.  
We use the Fair Isaac’s FICO score to proxy for credit history.  FICO scores are used by 
prominent lenders such as Countrywide and IndyMac Bank as part of their pricing and 
interest rate matrices.  If the applicant and the lender can negotiate and the borrower has 
the ability to adjust their credit score, then FICO should be considered an endogenous 
variable.  However, FICO scores reflect a long history of past payments and are difficult 
to improve in the short run.
9  Therefore, we treat FICO as an exogenous variable. 
 
We also use the LTV of the loan at origination because it also plays an important role in 
the pricing matrices.  Larger down payments (smaller LTVs) are used by lenders to help 
compensate for other risk factors such as weak credit history.  Therefore, for borrowers 
who are not wealth constrained, the down payment can be used to adjust to the prevailing 
interest rates and thus LTVs and interest rates may be jointly determined.  For example, 
Ling and McGill (1998) show that the demand for mortgage debt is affected by borrower 
income, wealth, and other factors.  Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Sanders (2004) use 
borrower income and age to proxy for wealth to identify the LTV equation in a similar 
mortgage spread analysis, which focused on the impact of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
on the cost of credit.  Unfortunately, our data set does not include borrower income or 
age, but we can use the average 2000 Census data on zip code average income and age as 
proxies for wealth.
10  In addition, they also include a measure of prevailing interest rates 
  17to proxy for debt servicing cost. We estimate the following system of equations using 
two-stage least squares in SAS version 9.1 for Windows: 
l
j j l j t j a j i
mkt
j r j f c j L T A I r F ltv ε β β β β β β β + + + + + + + =  (6) 
s
j j l j b j m j p c j L B M P S ε α α α α α + + + + + = . (7) 
In the first equation, ltv is the loan-to-value ratio indexed over j mortgages, F is the Fair 
Isaac’s credit score, r
mkt is the prevailing prime mortgage rate in the month of origination, 
I is the zip code average income, A is the zip code average age, T is a vector of year 
dummies from 1998 through 2005, and L is a vector of MSA dummies.  In the second 
equation, S is the interest rate spread (interest rate less 10 year Treasury yield or LIBOR 
depending on rate type), and P, M, B, L represent predatory lending laws, and mortgage, 
borrower, and location characteristics.  ε
l and ε
s represent identically and independently 
distributed random error terms.  To identify the impact of the law, P includes the 
previously discussed series of MSA dummies and PostLaw and Law interacted with the 
MSA dummies.  Vectors M and B also include the previously discussed  or the 
predicted loan-to-value ratio from the first stage and FICO, the borrower’s Fair Isaac 




Table 5 provides definitions of the variables used and Table 6 provides summary 
statistics for the estimation samples.  The system of equations is estimated separately for 
fixed and adjustable rate mortgages.  For fixed rate loans the spread is the difference 
between the interest rate on the loan and the yield on 10-year treasury bills (spread_frm).  
For adjustable rate loans the spread is defined as the margin on the loan or the difference 
  18between the fully index rate and the index (spread_arm).  The data set is limited to 30-
year term loans and the adjustable rate loans are limited to the dominate type which are 
the 2/28 arms indexed to the six month LIBOR, with rate adjusted every six months (after 
being fixed the first two years).
11
 
In general, subprime lenders charge more for lower credit scores and higher LTVs; 
therefore spreads should be higher for loans with higher LTVs and lower FICO scores.
12  
Loans for which the borrower provides little documentation (low doc) or no 
documentation (no doc) are likely to pay a premium to compensate for inaccurate, 
unstable, or illegal income and wealth sources.  As in the HMDA specification, loan size 
dummy variables are included in the analysis to capture the impact of fixed costs of 
origination and servicing being spread across larger loans.  Therefore, we expect that 
larger loans should pay lower spreads.  The lien position should also impact the price of 
credit.  First-lien loans have first rights to any recoveries on defaulted loans and, 
therefore, higher lien loans (subliens) should have a higher spread due to elevated default 
risk (loss severity).  Dummies indicating whether the loan is for purchase, refinance with 
additional cash taken (refi_cashout), and refinance without taking additional cash out 
(refi_nocash) may also affect the interest rate.  Loans that are purchased for investment 
opportunities (investor) or other purposes (other_purpose) are also likely to pay a 
premium.  Some of the loans also have private mortgage insurance (pmi).
13  Pmi insures 
the lender against losses incurred in the event that the borrower defaults on the loan.  The 
borrower, not the lender, pays for this insurance.  Therefore, a borrower who uses PMI 
  19should also be compensated by the lender with lower interest rates or fees, holding all 
other variables constant.   
 
As previously discussed, adjustable rate loans often have caps placed on the extent that 
the interest rate can change over time.  In particular, we include measures of the caps for 
the first adjustable time period and all subsequent time periods as percentages of the 
initial interest rate on the mortgage.  Since the rate on a 2/28 arm is fixed for the first 2 
years, if interest rates go up it could require a large interest rate adjustment to reach the 
fully indexed rate (index plus margin).  Therefore, most loans impose looser caps in the 
first adjustment than in subsequent periods.  For example, the first period cap, fcap, is 30 
percent (not percentage points) on average, while the subsequent periodic cap, pcap, is 14 
percent on average.  Adjustable rate loans also can include teasers that initially set the 
interest rate below the fully indexed rate.  The average teaser is 32 basis points.  In 
addition, the inclusion of caps means that lenders are subject to interest rate risks.  The 
two-period model theory indicates that, if the index on an adjustable rate loan is more 
volatile, the margin should be higher to compensate the lender.  We include a measure of 
index volatility in the adjustable rate loan model, namely, variance in the six-month 
LIBOR (libor_var). 
 
Ambrose and Sanders (2005) show that interest rates can also be affected by other 
important market factors.  In particular, they examine the impact of the difference 
between the “AAA” bond index and the “Baa” bond index to proxy for the cost of 
borrowing as well as a measure of the yield curve.  In addition, consistent with the two-
  20period model used above and from the options pricing framework, the volatility of house 
prices and interest rates are central to the value of a mortgage and hence its pricing and 
mortgage interest rates.  To control for these and other unobserved factors, time dummies 
are included that are specific to each metropolitan area for the one-year sample before 
and after the law comes into effect.  Therefore, these dummies will represent all national 
and micropolitan area and metropolitan area level factors that could affect interest rates in 
the mortgage market and spreads associated specifically with subprime lending.  
Results 
Table 6 indicates that the primary difference between adjustable and fixed rate loans is 
that adjustable rate loans are all first liens, they tend to be a little larger, and the 
borrower’s credit score tends to be lower (597 vs. 662).  
 
Details on the results of the first stage or LTV results are presented in Appendix B.  The 
results largely meet expectations.  Tables 7 and 8 report the results for the second stage or 
the spread results for both the fixed rate and adjustable rate specifications (equation 7) in 
which the predicted LTV ( ) is used.  The results differ from those found using HMDA 
and the results for fixed rate loans differ from those for adjustable rate loans.  For 
example, the impact of the typical law, as specified in model 1, on fixed rate mortgages is 
an increase in the spread by 14.5 basis points.  In addition, stronger laws are associated 
with larger increases in the spreads.  Laws with more restrictions are associated with 
higher spreads and laws with more coverage are associated with lower spreads.  
Therefore, while the impact of predatory lending laws on spreads for fixed rate loans is 
positive (the opposite of that found using the HMDA data), it is fairly modest.  This is 
∧
ltv
  21consistent with the notion that lender compliance cost is fairly minimal for most lenders.  
In contrast, the impact of the laws on adjustable rate spreads is negative, significant, and 
consistent with the results from HMDA.  For example, the typical law reduces the 
adjustable rate spread by 6.8 basis points.  Stronger laws are associated with larger 
decreases.  These decreases are associated with the extent of market coverage rather than 
the extent of restrictions in the law.
14
 
Control variables for location (MSA dummies), law status (law*MSA dummies), and 
time for each MSA (postlaw* MSA dummies) are not reported because we have no priors 
regarding significance or sign.  As expected coefficient estimates vary substantially from 
-1.42 to 1.83 with about two thirds being significant.  Borrower and mortgage 
characteristics also perform as expected.  For example, higher credit scores are associated 
with lower spreads for both adjustable and fixed rate loans.  In fact, many of the 
coefficients for adjustable and fixed rate loans provide similar findings.  For example, 
small loans and loans without PMI tend to have higher spreads.  In addition, investment 
loans tend to carry a premium as do loans with low documentation.  However, some 
variables have different signs and levels of significance.  In general, results will reflect 
the underwriting standards as they are applied to different product types.  For example, 
there should be no inherent difference between an identical refinanced loan and a for-
purchase loan; however, refinance loans that do not take any cash out are associated with 
lowers spreads for both adjustable and fixed rate loans.  Therefore, this result likely 
reflects unobserved factors associated with refinances that tend to make them less risky 
than for-purchase loans. 
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Mortgage characteristics for adjustable rate loans perform as expected.  For example, as 
predicted by the two-period model used to motivate differences between fixed and 
adjustable rate loans, loans with larger teasers pay a higher spread than loans without 
teasers.  In addition, loans with broad caps (less likely to be binding) on interest rate 
adjustments pay a lower spread because the borrower is assuming more of the interest 
rate risk. However, inconsistent with the theory, but consistent with prior empirical 
estimates, the variance of the index is associated with lower spreads (Sprecher and 
Willman, 1998). 
 
In summary, the results showed a modest positive and negative impact of predatory 
lending laws on interest spreads for fixed rate and adjustable rate loans, respectively.  
These results may reflect the ability of lenders to adjust the terms of adjustable rate loans 
more than on fixed rate loans in order to comply with the requirements of a predatory 
lending law.  Since the law triggers apply to the APR on adjustable rate loans, which 
assumes constant future interest rates, one method to avoid a predatory lending law is to 
adjust the caps on interest rate adjustments.  For example, a 10 percent increase in the 
first-period adjustment cap and periodic cap reduces the margin (fully adjusted interest 
rate) by over a full percentage point.  Therefore, lenders may loosen of caps in locations 
with a law coming into effect.  We calculated the percentage change in the cap strength 
over the pre-law to post-law period for both control and treatment locations and found 
that both (first and periodic) cap measures have increased (loosened) substantially more 
in locations with a law in effect.  For example, the first-period (periodic) cap increased by 
  2317 (6.5) percent in locations without a law, compared with 42.5 (16.9) percent in 
locations with a law coming into effect.   
 
As a result, it is possible to shift a significant proportion of borrowers so that the 
predatory lending law does not apply (not covered).  Take, for example, the laws in 
Illinois and Washington D.C., both of which have a first-lien APR trigger of 6 percent.  
These laws, using the HMDA national distributions in Figure 1, cover about 5.5 percent 
of loans, using only the APR trigger.  Assuming a one-percentage-point change in the 
margin roughly corresponds to the same change in the APR, adjusting the caps by 10 
percent in these locations can have the effect of shifting about two thirds of previously 
covered loans out of the laws’ coverage.  As a result, these borrowers will be facing more 
volatility in interest rates and payments in the future.  While this may not be a concern in 
a “down rate” environment, if interest rates increase substantially these borrowers will 
experience larger payment shocks than they would have with more stringent caps in 
place.  
Summary & Conclusion 
Since 1999, state and local predatory lending laws have spread to a geographically and 
demographically divergent collection of locations, including the states Maine, Maryland, 
and Nevada, among many others.  The laws tend to follow the structure of federal 
regulations as articulated by HOEPA; however, the local nature of the regulation has lead 
to spatially differentiated predatory lending laws, which have become today’s usury laws.  
This paper examines whether these laws are associated with increases or decreases in the 
cost of credit.  Evidence that the cost of credit increases when a law is enacted is 
  24consistent with a regulatory compliance cost being passed onto the consumer.  In 
contrast, evidence that the cost of credit decreases when a law is introduced provides 
additional support for beliefs that (1) predation has been a substantial problem in the 
subprime mortgage market and/or (2) lenders and borrower have been able to find 
alternative types of loans not covered by the law. 
 
The results of this paper provide two different and potentially contradictory results.  For 
example, in preliminary evidence using HMDA data, the APR (includes the periodic 
interest rate and upfront points and fees) spread is negatively associated with the 
introduction of a predatory lending law.  That is, the cost of credit is lower when there is 
a law after controlling for borrower, location, and some loan type characteristics.  
However, this data set suffers because it cannot control for crucial parts of the subprime 
(risk-based pricing) underwriting paradigm.  For example, the endogenously determined 
down payment and the credit score of the borrower are not available.  HMDA also cannot 
distinguish between adjustable and fixed rate loan types and provides no detail on the 
unique characteristics of adjustable rate loans, such as teasers, caps on interest rate 
adjustments, and the margin (the premium paid above the index when the rate is fully 
adjusted).  In addition, to date HMDA can provide only a cross-sectional view of the year 
2004. 
 
An alternative set of results, using a different data set that provides great detail about loan 
type, has substantially different results.  This data set provides a time series at the loan 
level that allows for a more complete differences-in-differences specification that can 
  25control for location and the time period before and after the law is approved and put into 
effect.  However, this data set does not provide any information on upfront fees and 
points.  In a cross-sectional estimation designed to mimic HMDA (no distinction made on 
rate adjustment type), the results for the interest rate spread were very similar to the 
results for the APR spread when using HMDA.  However, when a more complete model 
is formulated, the results indicate that the impact of the law depends on product type.  In 
particular, modest regulatory costs, as measured by the interest rate spread, seem to be 
passed to consumers using fixed rate subprime loans.  In contrast, the laws had a small 
negative impact on the interest rate spread of adjustable rate loans.   
 
One interpretation of this result is that it is relatively easy for adjustable rate loans to find 
a substitute loan type that can evade coverage of the law while maintaining the same 
expected return for the lender.  For example, one way to avoid being subject to a law is to 
reduce the APR below a predetermined threshold.  This can be done, while holding 
constant lender expected rates of return, by shifting the interest rate risk from the lender 
to the borrower by adjusting interest rate caps.  For example, results indicate that by 
increasing the initial period and periodic interest rate adjustment caps by 10 percent, the 
interest rate on a loan should drop by over 1 percentage point.  This type of adjustment is 
not possible for fixed rate loans without changing the expected rate of return.   
 
In summary the results indicate that state and local predatory lending laws have at most a 
modest regulatory cost, which is passed on to consumers.  However, this cost is only 
directly observable for fixed rate loans because it is straightforward on adjustable rate 
  26loans to evade law coverage by manipulating interest rate adjustment caps or other 
features.  In addition, while the 2004 release of HMDA may seem like a good source of 
information on borrower cost, any results are likely biased as a result of missing variables 
and misspecification. 
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1 Laws are first enacted by the local legislature and become effective typically at a later date.  It is not until 
the law becomes in effect that lenders are required to follow the new rules and restrictions. 
2 More details on the scaling and creation of the index are available in Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006).  
Before scaling of the index, points are assigned to each law using the following scheme: Coverage: Loan 
Purpose (HOEPA equivalent=0, all loans except no government loans=1, all loans except no reverse or 
open loans=2, all loans except no reverse, business, or construction loans=3, and all loans with no 
exceptions=4), APR Trigger 1st Lien (8%, HOEPA equivalent=0, 7%=1, 6%=2, and no trigger=3), APR 
Trigger Higher Liens (10%, HOEPA equivalent=0, 9%=1, 8%=2, 7%=3, and no trigger=4), Points and 
Fees Trigger (8%, HOEPA equivalent=0, 6%-7%=1, 5%=2, <5%=3, and no trigger=4).  Restrictions : 
Prepayment Penalty Prohibitions (No restriction=0, prohibition or percent limits after 60 months=1, 
prohibition or percent limits after 36 months=2, prohibition or percent limits after 24 months=3, and no 
penalties allowed=4),  Balloon Prohibitions (No restriction=0, no balloon if term<7 years (all term 
restrictions)=1, no balloon in first 10 years of mortgage=2, no balloon in first 10 years of mortgage and 
Cleveland=3, and no balloons allowed=4), Counseling Requirements (Not required=0, and required=1),  
Mandatory Arbitration Limiting Judicial Relief (Allowed=0,  partially restricted=1, and prohibited=2). 
3 An alternative explanation is that lenders respond by increasing the promotion or supply of subprime 
credit after a law is passed because any uncertainty about the legality of the loans has been removed.  
4 An alternative approach is to follow options pricing theory (for example, Buser et al. (1985), Hendershott 
and Shilling (1985), Kau et al. (1990)).  
5 Specification tests including borrower income were insignificant and are not reported. 
6 Loans that do not meet the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loan limit (conventional conforming loan limit) 
are not included in the sample.  In addition, concerns that loan size is an endogenous variable are mitigated 
by including only very gross loan size dummies and are not the focus of this paper. Passmore, Sherlund, 
and Burgess (2005) follow a similar strategy and include only a dummy for small loans. 
7 To test whether the same results would be found if upfront fees and points are excluded from the spread, a 
model is run using the interest rate spread as the dependent variable using 2005 loan originations data from 
LoanPerformance Asset Backed Securities (ABS).  The findings were very similar to those found using 
HMDA and the APR and are available in Appendix A.  For example, the impact of the typical law was a 
reduction in the spread by 8.9 basis points, while the HMDA APR results found a 11.7 basis point 
reduction in the spread.  In addition, we attempted to match HMDA to the LoanPerformance data set to 
obtain APR information.  Our overall 1-to-1 matching rate is 15 percent, given that we require perfect 
matching on location, loan amount, lien status, loan purpose, property type, and occupancy status.  We 
estimate a similar specification, using all available loan information to explain APR spread.  We find that 
the models generally have poor fit, weak precision, and some non-sensible coefficient estimates. We 
conclude that our matching is largely inaccurate and therefore do not report the results.   
8 Over the period 1998-2005 2/28 arm make up approximately 75 percent of the adjustable rate market 
(calculated from the LoanPerformance database). 
9 In contrast, credit scores can be dramatically affected by new derogatory information such as a charge-off 
or bankruptcy.  
10 The U.S. Census reports zip code tabulation areas, which were matched to the five-digit postal zip codes 
provided in the loan-level data. 
11 Over 98 percent of the 2/28 adjustable rate loans in our sample have these features. 
12 Additional specification tests were conducted by interacting FICO with LTV to test for evidence that the 
marginal cost of providing a smaller down payment increases for borrowers with lower credit scores.  
Evidence was found of this effect for fixed rate loans, but not for adjustable rate loans.  All other 
coefficient estimates were not materially affected by including FICO and LTV interactions. 
13 In the prime mortgage market Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require that loans with less than a 20 percent 
down payment also have PMI.  As a result, PMI and LTV are almost perfectly collinear.  This relationship 
does not hold in subprime.  Many loans with little or even no equity do not have PMI, but are charged 
directly through upfront fees and the periodic interest rate for the increased credit risk. 
  28                                                                                                                                                 
14 Indicating the importance of controlling for the unique features associated with adjustable rate loans, 
additional specification tests that did not include measures of adjustment rate caps lead to larger and more 
negative coefficient estimates for Ineffect. 
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Arkansas 10.06  2.73  7.33 
California 7.07  5.09  1.98 
Chicago, IL  12.64  10.20  2.43 
Cleveland, OH  15.19  4.35  10.84 
Colorado 16.19  12.87  3.31 
Connecticut 6.92  2.73  4.20 
Cook County, IL  12.64  10.20  2.43 
Florida 1.98  0.00  1.98 
Georgia 14.88  4.13  10.76 
Illinois 17.16  8.73  8.43 
Indiana 7.55  2.36  5.19 
Kentucky 4.95  0.74  4.22 
Maine 1.47  1.47  0.00 
Maryland 10.51  5.84  4.67 
Massachusetts 9.68  4.13  5.55 
Nevada 1.47  1.47  0.00 
New Jersey  6.27  3.13  3.14 
New Mexico  12.91  6.28  6.63 
New York  6.82  4.13  2.69 
North Carolina  5.07  1.11  3.96 
Ohio 2.38  1.47  0.90 
Oklahoma 4.59  0.74  3.85 
Pennsylvania 2.92  1.47  1.44 
South Carolina  8.83  2.36  6.47 
Texas 3.79  0.74  3.06 
Utah 2.55  1.47  1.08 
Washington, DC  14.89  10.50  4.39 
Wisconsin 2.63  1.55  1.08 
Average 8.00  4.00  4.00 
Standard Deviation  4.98  3.52  2.87 
 
  32Table 2: List of Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas  
Variable name  Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas 
ar1  Fayetteville - Springdale - Rogers AR-MO 
ar2  Memphis TN-MS-AR 
dc  Washington - Arlington - Alexandria DC-VA-WV 
ga1  Chattanooga TN-GA 
ga2  Columbus GA-AL 
il1  Burlington IA-IL 
il2  Cape Girardeau - Jackson MO-IL 
il3  Davenport - Moline - Rock Island IA-IL 
il4  Quincy IL-MO 
il5  St Louis MO-IL 
in  South Bend - Mishawaka IN-MI 
ky1  Clarksville TN-KY 
ky2  Huntington - Ashland WV-KY 
ky3  Union City TN-KY 
ma1  Boston - Cambridge - Quincy MA-NH 
ma2  Providence - New Bedford - Fall River RI-MA 
md1  Cumberland MD-WV 
md2  Hagerstown - Martinsburg MD-WV 
nc  Virginia Beach - Norfolk - Newport News VA-NC 
oh1  Parkersburg - Marietta WV-OH 
oh2  Point Pleasant WV-OH 
oh3  Weirton - Steubenville WV-OH 
oh4  Wheeling WV-OH 
pa  Philadelphia - Camden - Wilmington PA-DE 
ut  Logan UT-ID 
wi1  Duluth MN-WI 
wi2  Iron Mountain MI-WI 
wi3  La Crosse WI-MN 
wi4  Marinette WI-MI 
wi5  Minneapolis - St Paul - Bloomington MN-WI 
njpa  Allentown - Bethlehem - Easton PA-NJ 
nynjpa  New York - Northern New Jersey - Long Island NY-NJ-PA 
ohky  Cincinnati - Middletown OH-KY 
ohpa  Youngstown OH-PA 
txar  Texarkana TX-AR 
Notes: Cross-sectional (HMDA) estimation excludes laws that are passed in 2004 (IL, IN, UT, 
WI). Multiple-law MSAs are used in law index models (models 2 and 3).  Panel estimation 
(LoanPerformance) only includes single-law MSAs. 
  33Table 3: Definition and Descriptive Statistics of HMDA Variables 
Variable Definition  Mean   Std. dev. 
   Dependent variable          
spread  Annual Percentage Rate (APR) minus yield on 
Treasury securities of comparable maturity (%). 
4.727 1.720 
   Identification          
ineffect 
 
Dummy indicates loan is in location with a 
predatory lending law in effect. Loans in 
locations without a law in effect are the 
reference group. 
0.732 0.443 
   Mortgage           
small_loan  Dummy indicates loan amounts in the lower 
quartile of observed loan amounts.  The two 
middle quartiles is the reference group. 
0.219 0.413 
large_loan  Dummy indicates loan amounts in the upper 
quartile of observed loan amounts. The two 
middle quartiles is the reference group. 
0.293 0.455 
home_improv  Dummy indicates loan is contracted for home 
improvement purpose. Home purchase is the 
reference group. 
0.074 0.261 
refi  Dummy indicates loan is contracted for 
refinancing purpose. Home purchase is the 
reference group. 
0.567 0.495 
investor  Dummy indicates nonowner-occupancy status. 
Owner occupied is the reference group. 
0.087 0.283 
sublien  Dummy indicates loan is secured by a 
subordinate lien. First lien is the reference 
group. 
0.219 0.414 
   Location/Borrower           
fico_tract  Average FICO score of Census tract, calculated 
from LoanPerformance ABS database. 
639.5 17.4 
hispanic  Dummy indicates borrower is of Hispanic or 
Latino ethnicity. The reference group is non-
Hispanic. 
0.142 0.349 
nonwhite  Dummy indicates borrower is of a race other 
than white. The reference group is white. 
0.342 0.474 
Notes: These statistics are for the full sample including all multiple-law MSAs. 
  34Table 4: Impact of Predatory Lending Laws on APR 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
    Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
intercept  4.485** 0.192  4.328** 0.126  4.334** 0.126 
      Identification         
ineffect  -0.117**  0.012  -- -- -- -- 
law_index  -- --  -0.010**  0.001  -- -- 
coverage   -- -- -- --  -0.012**  0.003 
restrictions   -- -- -- --  -0.007*  0.003 
   Mortgage             
small_loan  0.462** 0.013  0.459** 0.009  0.459** 0.009 
large_loan  -0.140** 0.011  -0.102** 0.007  -0.101** 0.007 
home_improv  0.713** 0.016  0.573** 0.011  0.573** 0.011 
refi  0.229** 0.009  0.174** 0.006  0.175** 0.006 
investor  -0.015 0.015  -0.005 0.010  -0.005 0.010 
sublien  2.581** 0.014  2.567** 0.009  2.567** 0.009 
   Location/Borrower             
fico_tract  -0.081** 0.029  -0.052** 0.019  -0.053** 0.019 
hispanic  -0.009 0.015  -0.005 0.009  -0.005 0.009 
nonwhite  0.137** 0.010  0.114** 0.006  0.115** 0.006 
ar1   0.136** 0.031  0.115** 0.028  0.105** 0.031 
ar2  0.183** 0.018  0.169** 0.017  0.169** 0.017 
dc  -0.104** 0.017  -0.123** 0.015  -0.121** 0.015 
ga1  0.158** 0.026  0.165** 0.024  0.161** 0.024 
ga2  0.555** 0.037  0.587** 0.035  0.574** 0.039 
ky1  -0.029 0.041  -0.054 0.039  -0.056 0.039 
ky2  0.132**  0.047 0.099*  0.043 0.095*  0.043 
ky3  0.311** 0.097  0.321** 0.092  0.320** 0.092 
ma1  -0.061** 0.020  -0.108** 0.017  -0.111** 0.017 
ma2  -0.154** 0.020  -0.188** 0.018  -0.189** 0.018 
md1  0.190** 0.067  0.165** 0.063  0.166** 0.063 
md2  -0.035 0.037  -0.049 0.034  -0.047 0.034 
oh1   0.092 0.055 0.060 0.052 0.060 0.052 
oh2  0.233 0.121 0.191 0.114 0.192 0.114 
oh3  0.093 0.061 0.029 0.057 0.030 0.057 
oh4  0.077 0.060 0.037 0.056 0.038 0.056 
pa  0.032 0.019  -0.010 0.015  -0.010 0.015 
njpa  --  --  0.030 0.024 0.030 0.024 
nynjpa  --  --  -0.057** 0.014  -0.055** 0.015 
ohky  --  --  -0.005 0.017  -0.006 0.017 
ohpa  --  --  0.044 0.025 0.045 0.025 
txar  --  --  0.018 0.053 0.010 0.053 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.486 0.505 0.505 
Number of loans  95,633  199,030  199,030 
Notes: Estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS); HMDA 2004 cross section;  Dependent 
variable is spread between APR and T-bill rate of comparable maturity;  fico_tract is expressed in 
100’s; ** indicates significance at 99% level and * indicates significance at 95% level. 
  35Table 5: Definition of LoanPerformance Variables 
Variable Definition 
   Dependent variables    
spread_frm  Spread on fixed rate loans: interest rate minus yield on 10-year T-bill (%) 
spread_arm  Spread on adjustable rate loans: margin = fully indexed rate - 6-month 
LIBOR (%). 
   Identification     
law  Dummy indicates location with a predatory lending law. 
postlaw  Dummy indicates post-legislation time period. 
ineffect  Interaction of law and postlaw indicating property is in a location with a law 
currently effective. 
   Borrower/Mortgage    
fico  Borrower's Fair Isaac credit score. 
ltv  Loan-to-value ratio. 
small_loan  Dummy indicates loan amounts in the lower quartile of observed loan 
amounts. The two middle quartiles are the reference group. 
large_loan  Dummy indicates loan amounts in the upper quartile of observed loan 
amounts. The two middle quartiles are the reference group. 
pmi  Dummy indicates loan has private mortgage insurance. 
lowdoc  Dummy indicates borrower provides low document  
Full document is the reference group. 
nodoc  Dummy indicates borrower provides no document 
Full document is the reference group. 
sublien  Dummy indicates loan is secured by a subordinate lien 
First lien is the reference group. 
refi_cashout  Dummy indicates loan is contracted for refinancing purpose, with cash out 
Purchase is the reference group. 
refi_nocash  Dummy indicates loan is contracted for refinancing purpose, no cash out 
Purchase is the reference group. 
other_purpose  Dummy indicates loan is contracted for another purpose 
Purchase is the reference group. 
investor  Dummy indicates nonowner-occupancy status 
Owner occupied is the reference group. 
   ARM only    
teaser  Spread between initial interest rate and fully indexed rate. 
fcap  First period cap as percentage of initial interest rate. 
pcap  Periodic cap as percentage of initial interest rate. 
libor_var  Std. dev. in the index (6-month LIBOR) over the previous 6 months. 
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Variable  FRM sample  ARM sample 
   Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev. 
   Dependent variables         
spread_frm  4.000 2.189  --  -- 
spread_arm  -- --  6.247  1.059 
   Identification         
law  0.341 0.474 0.281 0.450 
postlaw  0.548 0.498 0.672 0.469 
ineffect  0.193 0.395 0.206 0.405 
   Borrower/Mortgage         
fico  662.1 69.2 596.6 57.4 
ltv  83.1 18.6 81.8 11.5 
small_loan  0.346 0.476 0.112 0.316 
large_loan  0.180 0.384 0.215 0.411 
pmi  0.237 0.425 0.272 0.445 
lowdoc  0.266 0.442 0.276 0.447 
nodoc  0.023 0.150 0.006 0.075 
sublien  0.230 0.421 0.000 0.000 
refi_cashout  0.562 0.496 0.549 0.498 
refi_nocash  0.147 0.354 0.116 0.321 
other_purpose  0.001 0.036 0.001 0.024 
investor  0.118 0.322 0.073 0.260 
   ARM only         
teaser  -- --  0.324  1.518 
fcap  -- --  0.300  0.119 
pcap  -- --  0.140  0.042 
libor_var  -- --  0.243  0.154 
Sample size  66,208  57,569 
 
  37Table 7: Impact of Predatory Lending Laws on Fixed Rate Mortgages 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 4 
   Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
intercept  8.396**  0.167 8.395** 0.167 8.410**  0.167 
      Identification        
ineffect  0.145**  0.034  -- -- -- -- 
law_index  -- --  0.009** 0.003  -- -- 
coverage  -- -- -- --  -0.034**  0.011 
restrictions  -- -- -- --  0.052**  0.011 
      Borrower/Mortgage        
fico  -0.011**  0.000 -0.011** 0.000 -0.011**  0.000 
∧
ltv   0.022**  0.002 0.022** 0.002 0.022**  0.002 
small_loan  0.503**  0.016 0.503** 0.016 0.503**  0.016 
large_loan  -0.126**  0.017 -0.125** 0.017 -0.127**  0.017 
pmi  -0.038**  0.014 -0.038** 0.014 -0.038**  0.014 
lowdoc  0.137**  0.013 0.137** 0.013 0.136**  0.013 
nodoc  0.527**  0.037 0.527** 0.037 0.528**  0.037 
sublien  2.617**  0.019 2.617** 0.019 2.617**  0.019 
refi_cashout  0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 
refi_nocash  -0.587**  0.018 -0.587** 0.018 -0.586**  0.018 
other_purpose  -0.182 0.151  -0.181 0.151  -0.183 0.151 
investor  0.217**  0.018 0.217** 0.018 0.218**  0.018 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.592 0.592 0.593 
Number of loans  66,208  66,208  66,208 
Notes: Second-stage results of Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), LP panel 1998-2005; Dependent 
variable is spread between interest rate and 10-year T-bill; fico and ltv are expressed in 10’s; 
is predicted value of ltv from first stage; Coefficients for msa, law and postlaw dummies are 




  38Table 8: Impact of Predatory Lending Laws on Adjustable Rate Mortgages 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
   Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
intercept  10.338** 0.196 10.340** 0.196 10.347** 0.196 
      Identification        
ineffect  -0.068**  0.024  -- -- -- -- 
law_index  -- --  -0.006**  0.002  -- -- 
coverage  -- -- -- --  -0.024**  0.009 
restrictions  -- -- -- --  0.014  0.009 
      Borrower/Mortgage        
teaser  0.587** 0.003  0.587** 0.003  0.587** 0.003 
fcap  -2.287** 0.033  -2.287** 0.033  -2.287** 0.033 
pcap  -8.025** 0.090  -8.024** 0.090  -8.027** 0.090 
libor_var  -0.353** 0.028  -0.353** 0.028  -0.353** 0.028 
fico  -0.005** 0.000  -0.005** 0.000  -0.005** 0.000 
∧
ltv   -0.011** 0.004  -0.011** 0.004  -0.011** 0.004 
small_loan  0.247** 0.012  0.247** 0.012  0.246** 0.012 
large_loan  -0.122** 0.009  -0.122** 0.009  -0.122** 0.009 
pmi  -0.057** 0.008  -0.057** 0.008  -0.056** 0.008 
lowdoc  0.101** 0.008  0.101** 0.008  0.101** 0.008 
nodoc  -0.327** 0.045  -0.327** 0.045  -0.327** 0.045 
refi_cashout  -0.183** 0.008  -0.183** 0.008  -0.183** 0.008 
refi_nocash  -0.183** 0.012  -0.183** 0.012  -0.183** 0.012 
other_purpose  0.453** 0.140  0.453** 0.140  0.453** 0.140 
investor  0.110** 0.014  0.110** 0.014  0.110** 0.014 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.466 0.466 0.466 
Number of loans  57,569  57,569  57,569 
Notes: Second-stage results of 2SLS, LP panel 1998-2005; Dependent variable is spread between 
fully indexed rate and 6-month LIBOR (margin); fico and ltv are expressed in 10’s;  is 
predicted value of ltv from first stage; Coefficients for msa, law and postlaw dummies are not 
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Appendix  
Table A1: Interest Rate Spread Results, 2004 Cross Section, LoanPerformance Data 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
    Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
intercept  6.309** 0.184 6.227** 0.108 6.161** 0.109
   Identification     
law  -0.089** 0.014 -- -- --  --
law_index  -- -- 0.001 0.001 -- --
coverage  -- -- -- -- -0.026**  0.003
restrictions  -- -- -- -- 0.030**  0.004
   Borrower/Mortgage    
fico  -0.011** 0.000 -0.011** 0.000 -0.011** 0.000
∧
ltv   0.041** 0.003  0.040** 0.001  0.041** 0.001 
small_loan  0.280** 0.015 0.211** 0.011 0.211** 0.011
large_loan  -0.080** 0.013 -0.069** 0.009 -0.066** 0.009
pmi  0.290** 0.012 0.242** 0.008 0.242** 0.008
lowdoc  0.045** 0.011 0.049** 0.007 0.049** 0.007
nodoc  -0.588** 0.034 -0.562** 0.022 -0.562** 0.022
sublien  3.439** 0.030 3.517** 0.021 3.516** 0.021
refi_cashout  -0.225** 0.012 -0.258** 0.008 -0.256** 0.008
refi_nocash  -0.339** 0.019 -0.385** 0.013 -0.385** 0.013
other_purpose  1.644** 0.216 1.024** 0.145 1.020** 0.145
investor  0.002 0.017 0.048** 0.012 0.053**  0.012
   Location      
ar1   -0.080 0.047 -0.178** 0.046 -0.312**  0.049
ar2  0.028 0.024 0.055* 0.023 0.051*  0.023
dc  -0.115** 0.027 -0.142** 0.021 -0.107** 0.021
ga1  0.000 0.032 -0.009 0.032 -0.066*  0.032
ga2  0.091 0.048 0.035 0.048 -0.121*  0.051
ky1  -0.213** 0.057 -0.203** 0.056 -0.222** 0.056
ky2  0.055 0.072 0.056 0.071 0.000 0.071
ky3  0.020 0.192 0.069 0.191 0.054 0.192
ma1  -0.147** 0.033 -0.243** 0.025 -0.274** 0.026
ma2  -0.244** 0.029 -0.263** 0.024 -0.266** 0.024
md1  0.069 0.094 0.028 0.093 0.052 0.093
md2  -0.044 0.045 -0.103* 0.044 -0.083 0.044
oh1   0.005 0.106 0.023 0.105 0.030 0.106
oh2  0.138 0.202 0.100 0.201 0.115 0.202
oh3  0.030 0.089 0.027 0.088 0.037 0.088
oh4  0.087 0.084 0.100 0.083 0.107 0.083
pa  -0.131** 0.023 -0.157** 0.018 -0.154** 0.019
njpa  -- -- -0.177** 0.030 -0.176**  0.030
nynjpa  -- -- -0.141** 0.022 -0.111**  0.022
ohky  -- -- -0.148** 0.023 -0.158**  0.023
ohpa  -- -- -0.117** 0.033 -0.106**  0.034
txar  -- -- 0.132 0.088 0.051  0.089
Adjusted R-squared 0.407 0.387 0.385
Number of loans  63,774 141,714 141,714
Notes: See Table 5 for variable definitions.  Second-stage results of 2SLS results reported using 
LoanPerformance data for loans originated in 2004.  The dependent variable is spread between interest rate and 
T-bill rate of comparable maturity regardless of product type.  fico and ltv are expressed in 10’s; ltv is the 
predicted value of LTV from first stage which is not reported. ** indicates significance at 99% level and * 
indicates significance at 95% level. 
∧
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Table A2: First Stage Estimation of Loan-to-Value Ratio (ltv) 
Variable FRM  sample ARM sample
   Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
intercept  60.558** 3.585  48.954** 2.353 
   Borrower/Market         
fico  0.029** 0.001 0.053** 0.001 
frm_30  0.911** 0.257  -0.069  0.184 
income  0.365** 0.015 0.107** 0.012 
incomesq  -0.003** 0.000  -0.001** 0.000 
age  0.358* 0.179  0.302**  0.114 
agesq  -0.013** 0.002  -0.007** 0.002 
   Time   
y98  -0.630 0.775  -4.146**  1.393 
y99   3.320** 0.707  -2.038** 0.598 
y00  4.180** 0.676  -2.698** 0.478 
y01  3.643** 0.463  -1.264** 0.318 
y02  2.457** 0.342  -1.779** 0.196 
y03  -0.468 0.269  -1.353**  0.145 
y04  0.260 0.292  -0.523**  0.141 
   Location   
ar1  -7.579** 0.788 1.913** 0.739 
ar2  -6.674** 0.532 3.043** 0.611 
dc  -14.916** 0.524  -3.621** 0.608 
ga1  -6.039** 0.622 2.248** 0.678 
ga2  -3.969** 0.759 3.051** 0.834 
il1  2.762 2.397  0.831 1.192 
il2  -8.338** 1.459 3.237** 1.007 
il3  -2.759** 0.765 1.945** 0.672 
il4  -3.671 3.323  4.507*  1.894 
il5  -7.110** 0.522 0.968  0.599 
in  -4.509** 0.679 1.680** 0.651 
ky1  -5.054** 0.871 1.818*  0.827 
ky2  -4.554** 1.102 2.544** 0.871 
ky3  -1.654 2.357  2.743 1.780 
ma1  -19.681** 0.483  -7.893** 0.587 
ma2  -10.395** 0.536  -3.111** 0.610 
md1  0.059 1.526  1.141 1.517 
md2  -3.641** 0.893 0.337  0.890 
oh1  -4.893** 1.411 3.296*  1.421 
oh2  -1.955 3.215  1.144 2.684 
oh3  -1.877 1.332  1.688 1.113 
oh4  -3.002* 1.438  1.342  1.239 
pa  -11.108** 0.466  -1.075  0.591 
ut  -10.130** 1.212  -2.011*  0.966 
wi1  -7.939** 0.835  -0.533  0.711 
wi2  0.003 3.899  2.697 1.693 
wi3  -1.848 1.544  0.674 1.028 
wi4  -5.840** 1.609  -0.773  0.941 
wi5  -13.159** 0.527  -2.207** 0.602 
Adjusted R-squared  0.098  0.173 
Number of loans  66,208  57,569 
Notes: nc is the excluded msa; ** indicates significance at 99% level, * indicates significance at 95% 
level. 
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Table A2 provides the first-stage results used to calculate the predicted ltv for models 1, 2, 
and 3 for both the adjustable and fixed rate loans as reported in Tables 7 and 8. The results 
substantially meet prior expectations.  For example, the proxies for wealth indicate that older 
borrowers and borrowers with more income are able to support smaller down payments.  
However, the relationships are both nonlinear.  The smallest down payments are made by 
borrowers making approximately $61,000 and borrowers almost 54 years old.  Also consistent 
with subprime underwriting requirements, borrowers with worse credit history tend to provide 
larger down payments to compensate for the increased credit risk associated with lower credit 
scores.  Consistent with Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Sanders (2004) the market interest rate 
is negatively associated with down payments for fixed rate loans.  The time dummy variables 
control for changing macroeconomic conditions that could impact subprime interest rates and 
MSA dummies also proxy for other missing variables such as the affordability of housing.  
Therefore, we have no strong priors on the sign or magnitude of these variables. 
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